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Proving a Violation: Rhetoric,
Research and Remedy
Alan N. Young*

I. INTRODUCTION
Legal systems animated by the rule of law often achieve
predictability but rarely reflect the diversity of the human condition. The
universality of rights and the generality of legislation is the foundation of
the rule of law, but painting with broad strokes often undercuts the ability
of the law to address the nuances of life. At a conceptual level, rights can
only be called rights if they operate at a level of universality; however,
moral intuition suggests that there will be specific cases when a person’s
bad deeds or bad character leads us to believe that these people should
not deserve the full protection of rights, and that their harmful acts
should lead to a forfeiture of their rights. Clearly this moral intuition
seeps into the law. It can be seen operating within the development of the
exclusionary remedy under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms1 as the balancing of the court-developed factors for
exclusion often leads to the predictable result that the more we fear or
loathe the accused, the less likely a court will remedy a proven rights
violation.
Another area in which there is clash between the concept of the
universality of rights and the moral intuition that there may be people
undeserving of rights protection arises from the 1985 Big M 2 principle
that an accused person is entitled to challenge a law that violates the
rights of third parties but applies in a constitutionally sound manner with
respect to the accused. Just as there are very few criminals who are
completely beyond redemption, there are few laws that are categorically
Co-Founder and Director of Osgoode’s Innocence Project.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th)
321 (S.C.C.).
*
1
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bad. More often than not, a critical review of a piece of legislation will
lead to the conclusion that the law is “substantially constitutional and
peripherally problematic”.3 It is not unreasonable to wonder why an
accused whose actions fit within the “substantially constitutional” part of
a law should be entitled to challenge the law on behalf of others who
hypothetically may fall within the “peripherally problematic” part of this
law. The aspiration to achieve universality of rights seems to demand that
some undeserving moral characters be windfall beneficiaries of the rights
enterprise.
After 30 years of Charter litigation, it still remains uncertain as to
when a court will invalidate an entire provision or regime, when it will
read down and reinterpret, or when it will simply choose to sever the
offending portion of the law. In addition, the courts continue to debate
the viability of simply granting a personal remedy by way of
constitutional exemption despite the many judicial pronouncements
suggesting that this remedy is not “just and appropriate”.
In 2013 the Supreme Court of Canada in Bedford invalidated three
interrelated provisions governing the sex trade and the decision was
unanimous, unequivocal and unwavering in its rejection of blind
deference to the idea that Parliament knows best.4 The decision is lucid
and well reasoned;5 however, the decision did not address the question as
to how a court should respond to a challenge of an impugned law that in
some respects operates in a constitutionally proper manner and in other
respects clearly violates the rights of some who are affected by the
legislation.
The Bedford case did not directly raise this question of the proper
judicial response to a “peripherally problematic” law as the Court found
that the overly broad and grossly disproportionate operation of the three
impugned sex trade laws rendered these provisions beyond judicial
repair. This finding was supported by a voluminous record of expert,
3
R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 111, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Sharpe”].
4
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, 366 D.L.R.
(4th) 237 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bedford SCC”]. The Court invalidated certain Criminal Code
provisions: communication for the purpose of prostitution (s. 213(1)(c)), living on the avails of
prostitution (s. 212(1)(j)) and keeping a bawdy house for purposes of prostitution (s. 210). See
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 213, 212, 210.
5
It should be disclosed that I was lead counsel on this case and it is therefore not
surprising that I would be very pleased with the result. Accordingly, it could be said that I do not
have the requisite objectivity to praise the decision, so in this paper I will not extol the virtues of the
decision, but rather address one anomaly I see arising out of the decision.
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experiential, international and statistical evidence. However, the Court
paid scant attention to this legislative fact evidence, focusing instead on
the experiential evidence of the three applicants. It appears that the
legislative fact evidence may have been relegated to background context
without constitutional significance because the Court was clear in
pointing out that “gross disproportionality is not concerned with the
number of people who experience grossly disproportionate effects; a
grossly disproportionate effect on one person is sufficient to violate a
constitutional norm”.6
This appears to be an unremarkable and trite comment as it is
obvious that an applicant who can demonstrate that the law impacts upon
his or her life, liberty or security in a constitutionally infirm manner is
deserving of a protective remedy. However, it is not obvious and trite to
conclude that this remedy must be the invalidation of a statutory
provision that applies in a constitutionally sound manner to others. The
Bedford case may have been grounded in a wide array of evidence
demonstrating that the impugned laws violate the rights of many beyond
the applicants; however, in the context of a Big M constitutional
challenge launched as part of a defence to a criminal charge, the
proposition advanced by the Court would mean that an accused has the
power to invalidate a provision on the basis of “reasonable
hypotheticals” which show that the law may impact the rights of persons
other than the accused.
In the context of the constitutional review of criminal laws for
compliance with the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 of
the Charter, this brief paper will address two related issues that need to
be resolved in order to develop a coherent and consistent approach to
laws that are “substantially constitutional and peripherally problematic”.
First, the primary focus of this paper will be on the issue of the nature
and quality of evidence needed to prove a constitutional violation.
Litigants need clear direction on the simple question of how to prove
that, in effect, a challenged law impairs life, liberty or security. Although
the conventional wisdom suggests that constitutional challenges should
be supported by a wide array of legislative fact evidence, the Court’s
comment in Bedford now suggests that this evidence is unnecessary and
of little relevance as an unconstitutional “effect on one person is
sufficient to violate a constitutional norm”.

6

Bedford SCC, supra, note 4, at para. 122.
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Second, this paper will provide a cursory analysis of the rationale
and political viability of invalidating a legislative provision to remedy a
proven violation of the rights on one person. The evidentiary and
remedial issues are interrelated. If a constitutional challenge cannot
succeed without the tendering of legislative fact evidence showing the
impact of the law on third parties and societal interests then the remedial
issue is less contentious; that is, invalidation will be predicated on proof
that the unconstitutional effects of the law are prevalent and recurring.
However, if legislative fact evidence is simply icing on the cake which
need not be raised to achieve invalidation then a court must consider the
issue of whether invalidation is the proper and justifiable remedy as it
will only have for consideration evidence showing that the law uniquely
affects the constitutional interests of the applicant before the court.

II. THE RISE AND FALL OF LEGISLATIVE FACT EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court’s suggestion that invalidation may flow from the
demonstration that one person’s section 7 rights have been violated
stands out as anomalous in light of the fact that many analysts and
commentators have pointed out that successful invalidations in recent
years have been predicated and driven by comprehensive and
voluminous evidentiary records.7 Is the Court now suggesting that this
exercise of compiling and presenting research and statistical data has
been a monumental waste of time?
It is unclear whether the Court is signalling a change in perspective
and approach in which the role of legislative fact evidence is diminished.
As will be discussed, in the past the Court has invited litigants to be more
inclusive and comprehensive in the development of legislative fact
records; however, there are no certain rules and principles governing the
Michelle Bloodworth, “A Fact is a Fact is a Fact: Stare Decisis and the Distinction
between Adjudicative and Social Facts in Bedford and Carter” (2014) 32 N.J.C.L. 193 [hereinafter
“Bloodworth, ‘A Fact is a Fact’”]; Michael Da Silva, “Trial Level References: In Defence of a New
Presumption” (2002) 2 W.J. Legal Stud. 1 [hereinafter “Da Silva, ‘Trial Level References’”]; John
David Lee, C. Tess Sheldon & Roberto Lattanzio, “Law and Ordered C.H.A.O.S.: Social Science
Methodology, and the Charter Claims of Persons with Disabilities” (2013) 32 N.J.C.L. 61; Jula
Hughes & Vanessa MacDonnell, “Social Science Evidence in Constitutional Rights Cases in
Germany and Canada: Some Comparative Observations” (2013) 32 N.J.C.L. 23 [hereinafter
“Hughes & MacDonnell, ‘Social Science Evidence’”]; Maria Powell, “Moving Beyond the
Prostitution Reference: Bedford v. Canada” (2013) 64 U.N.B.L.J. 187 [hereinafter “Powell, ‘Beyond
Prostitution Reference’”]; Don Stuart, “Striking Down Prostitution Laws and Revising Section 7
Standards to Focus on Arbitrariness” (2014) 7 C.R. (7th) 52.
7
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manner of admission and the probative value of the evidence. All one can
really say is that current practice of litigants, and the conventional
wisdom of analysts, indicate that legislative fact evidence is an
indispensable component in proving a violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security enshrined in section 7.
As has been noted, “social science evidence has become an
important feature of litigation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms”.8 It has also been asserted that “[t]he reality is that in many
Charter cases ... [i]t is the legislative facts or social facts that are likely
to prove dispositive … The Bedford and Carter cases are two recent
examples of situations where changing social science evidence had an
important effect on the disposition of rights for the claimants.”9 With
respect to Bedford, the application hearing judge’s treatment of the
legislative fact record has been praised as being “an excellent example of
how a judge can go beyond the invocation of intuition and common
sense to reach a factual conclusion about contested empirical matters”.10
Recent practice in constitutional adjudication under section 7 suggests
that the litigants believe a meritorious challenge must be accompanied by an
extensive sampling of legislative fact evidence. As Da Silva has noted:
Recent constitutional jurisprudence has seen an increasing role for
expert evidence and social science research in the determination of
contentious cases. Trial level constitutional arguments in Bedford v
Canada (concerning the constitutionality of criminal prohibitions
against prostitution-related activities), Canada (Attorney General) v
PHS Community Services Society (concerning constitutional
exemptions from criminal drug trafficking offences for a safe injection
site), and Carter v Canada (Attorney General) (concerning the
constitutionality of criminal prohibitions on physician-assisted dying)
relied heavily on expert submissions and social science data; in Insite,
trial level weighing of this information provided a factual basis for the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)’s ultimate determination.
Contemporaneous with these cases was the first use of British
Columbia’s trial level constitutional reference power: Reference re:
Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, also known as The
Polygamy Reference.11

Hughes & MacDonnell, “Social Science Evidence”, id., at 1.
Bloodworth, “A Fact is a Fact”, supra, note 7, at 4-5.
10
Hamish Stewart, “Bedford v Canada: Prostitution and Fundamental Justice” (2011) 57
Crim. L.Q. 197, at 209.
11
Da Silva, “Trial Level References”, supra, note, 7, at 1.
8
9
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Da Silva refers to the extensive use of legislative fact evidence as a
matter of “constitutional jurisprudence” but it appears to be more of a
developing litigation strategy than a matter of jurisprudence. Admittedly,
in the early Charter days, the Supreme Court of Canada did clearly
express a preference for challenges to be accompanied by legislative
facts of a contextual nature. The Court stated in 1989:
Charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum.
To attempt to do so would trivialize the Charter and inevitably result in
ill-considered opinions. The presentation of facts is not, as stated by the
respondent, a mere technicality; rather, it is essential to a proper
consideration of Charter issues. ... Charter decisions cannot be based
upon the unsupported hypotheses of enthusiastic counsel. 12

The Court may have been expressing a disdain for constitutional
arguments that proceed solely on the basis of the rhetoric of “enthusiastic
counsel”; however, one has to wonder whether the Court was inviting
counsel to convert a court hearing into a commission of inquiry.
The recent flurry of section 7 challenges were not simply
accompanied by a modest selection of contextual studies and research,
but rather were cases in which dozens of expert and experiential
witnesses testified and countless studies were tendered without the
requirement of calling the authors of the studies as witnesses.13 For

12

MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88, at para. 9, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at 361-62

(S.C.C.).
13

See, e.g., Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] O.J. No. 4057, 2010 ONSC
4264, 102 O.R. (3d) 321, at para. 84 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Bedford ONSC”] (88 volumes
containing over 25,000 pages of evidence were presented to the Court, in addition over 60 lay and
expert witnesses); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385,
at paras. 26, 89-91, 121, 143-147, 200 (S.C.C.) (the Court, having been presented with numerous
articles, reports, and studies, relied heavily on the 1977 Badgley Report and the 1987 Powell Report,
and heard from such witnesses as therapeutic abortion physicians); Canada (Attorney General) v.
PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, at paras. 60, 79-82
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”] (the claimants and the government each tendered affidavits from
medical practitioners assessing the efficacy of Insite); Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012]
B.C.J. No. 1196, 2012 BCSC 886, 287 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at paras. 114, 160, 278-279, 287, 299, 262-263
(B.C.S.C.), revd [2013] B.C.J. No. 2227, 2013 BCCA 435 (B.C.C.A.) (the evidentiary record
included some 36 binders, 116 affidavits, and 18 witnesses who were cross-examined on their
affidavits, including 11 witnesses who were cross-examined in court); Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1996] B.C.J. No. 71, 18 B.C.L.R. (3d) 241, at paras. 1,
110 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters BCSC”] (the Court heard testimony from many expert or
experiential witnesses, including artists, sociologists, psychologists, book distributors, librarians and
police officers); Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1935, 2008 BCSC 1363, at paras. 38, 45
(B.C.S.C.), vard [2009] B.C.J. No. 2451, 2009 BCCA 563 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Adams”] (the
trial judge referred to two reports related to homelessness, the Report of the Gap Analysis Team and
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example, in the recent polygamy reference, Bauman C.J.S.C. noted the
importance of a full evidentiary record in Charter litigation and stated,
“I have taken a liberal approach to admissibility in this proceeding,
admitting all the evidence tendered.”14 Thus Bauman C.J.S.C.’s
disposition regarding the constitutionality of section 293 of the Criminal
Code rested “on the most comprehensive judicial record on the subject
ever produced”.15 Chief Justice Bauman summarized the evidence as
being comprised of over 90 affidavits and expert reports. Approximately
22 of the affiants and experts were examined who represented “a broad
range of disciplines including anthropology, psychology, sociology, law,
economics, family demography, history and theology”.16 Many lay
witnesses also presented evidence of personal experiences within
polygamous relationships.17
The conversion of constitutional challenges into a wide-ranging
inquiry of social and political facts and values extends beyond the wellknown controversies involving drug injection sites, polygamous
relationships, assisted suicide and sex work. For example, in a recent
section 7 and section 15 challenge to the B.C. Corrections Branch’s
decision to cancel the Mother and Baby Program, which allowed inmates
to remain with their babies after giving birth while they served their
sentences, the Court heard and considered a wealth of contested evidence
concerning child-rearing practices and the bond between mother and
child. In finding the cancelled policy to be violative of rights, Ross J.
summarized evidence from 10 expert witnesses,18 and seven experiential
witnesses19 in addition to the two applicants. These witnesses included a
nurse, a sociologist, a psychologist, a physician, a law professor, a
professor of psychiatry, a clinical and forensic psychologist, a clinical
social worker, a correctional supervisor and some of the mothers in the

The Mayor’s Task Force Report); Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, at paras. 40, 42, 56, 62, 70-84, 114 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”] (the Court
was presented with at least five studies regarding wait times in Canada as well as further reports on
the status of health care in other Canadian provinces and other countries, in addition to the testimony
of at least seven doctors).
14
Reference re Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2211, 2011
BCSC 1588, 28 B.C.L.R. (5th) 96, at para. 46 (B.C.S.C.).
15
Id., at para. 6.
16
Id., at paras. 28-29.
17
Id., at paras. 26-51, 59-62, 104-105.
18
Inglis v. British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety), [2013] B.C.J. No. 2708, 2013
BCSC 2309, at paras. 255-322 (B.C.S.C.).
19
Id., at paras. 84-134.
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program. The Director of the Research, Planning & Offender
Programming at Corrections provided a report regarding the
“characteristics of the population of sentenced women in the province,
criminogenic risk factors and factors relating to recidivism”.20
Perhaps the most powerful indicator of the importance of legislative
fact evidence comes from the recent sex work challenge. In 1990, the
communications law and the bawdy house law were unsuccessfully
challenged under section 7 in the absence of any legislative facts
concerning the history, function and effect of these laws.21 In revisiting
this challenge in 2013 the Supreme Court was now faced with dozens of
witnesses, numerous government reports and studies and thousands of
pages of documentary evidence. The current invalidation of laws
previously upheld speaks volumes about the significance of contextual
evidence. As Powell notes:
The harms that sex workers face are at the heart of the Bedford case,
which is what separates it from the Prostitution Reference. Instead of
considering sex work generally, the Bedford appeal gives the issue a
human face and asks for the striking of laws that put sex workers at risk
of violence. The issue of harms and the wealth of evidence supporting
the fact that the impugned provisions of the Criminal Code aggravate
the harms faced by sex workers were not put forward in the Prostitution
Reference.
...
… The difference of opinion is understandable considering Himel J had
the benefit of over 25,000 pages of evidence, in addition to witnesses
ranging from sex workers, to police, to social workers, and academics.
Apart from the recommendations of the Special Committee on
Pornography and Prostitution which were released in 1985, much of the
evidence relied upon in the Bedford case was not available at the time
of the Prostitution Reference. 22

This asserted significance of the legislative fact evidence may be
exaggerated. First, the Supreme Court did not rely or refer to this new
evidence in any great detail. Second, the most salient difference between
the 1990 and 2013 cases is the “living tree” evolution of constitutional

20

Id., at para. 277.
Reference re ss. 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 1123, 56 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference” cited to S.C.R.].
22
Powell, “Beyond Prostitution Reference”, supra, note 7, at 189, 194 (citations omitted).
21
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doctrine and not the emergence of new facts.23 In 1990 the Court
recognized the “anomalous” and “bizarre” interplay of the sex trade
laws24 and there was some evidence available to demonstrate that these
laws overshot the mark and led to an increased risk of harm. 25 The
evidence in 1990 was still emerging and may not have been as
compelling as in the post-Pickton era; however, the real obstacle in 1990
was the undeveloped nature of the Charter. The irrationality of the law
could be recognized but without the development and expansion of the
principles of fundamental justice to include considerations of
arbitrariness (1990),26 overbreadth (1993)27 and gross disproportionality
(2003),28 the Court did not have the tools needed to condemn the law’s
irrationality in a constitutionally recognizable form.
Nonetheless, even with the rich development of constitutional
doctrine, it would be a strategic mistake to simply rely upon counsel’s
rhetoric to fit the vices of an impugned law into a recognized doctrine. In
2009 the British Columbia Court of Appeal found that a city by-law
23
Although Powell emphasized the importance of facts, she did recognize that the principles of
fundamental justice “have also evolved considerably in the intervening years” (id., at 189).
24
Prostitution Reference, supra, note 21, at 1162.
25
In debating the enactment of the communication law there was a recurring theme in the
debates to the effect that the new law would endanger sex workers. An outline and overview of the
relevant portions of these debates can be found in Appendix A of the Bedford Factum for
the Supreme Court of Canada. See Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72,
2013 SCC 72 (S.C.C.) (Factum of the Respondents) [hereinafter “Bedford SCC FOR”], online:
<http://bedfordsafehaveninitiative.com/supreme-court-of-canada/>. For specific examples, see, e.g.,
Bedford SCC FOR at 73 (citing from Pornography and Prostitution in Canada: Report of the
Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada, 1985), vol. 2, JAR, vol. 71, Tab 154B, at 21051-21053); Bedford SCC FOR at 74 (citing
from House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on
Bill C-49, Issue No. 4 (October 24,1985), JAR, vol. 72, Tab 155E, at 21495); Bedford SCC FOR at
75 (citing from House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative
Committee on Bill C-49, Issue No. 7 (October 31, 1985), JAR, vol. 73, Tab 155H, at 21646). In fact,
as Justice Wilson notes in the Prostitution Reference, the Crown argued:
([R]ather surprisingly … in light of the impact of s. 193 of the Criminal Code on attempts
to engage in prostitution from private premises) that one of the purposes of s. 195.1 is to
diffuse the activities associated with prostitution and ensure that prostitutes, like retailers
and consumers, conduct their activities on private premises and in a way which will avoid
the creation of a nuisance to others. (Prostitution Reference, supra, note 21, at 1213)
Thus it can be seen that lawmakers were aware of the risk of harm increasing but mistakenly concluded
that moving inside was an available legal option to mitigate the risks of working on the streets.
26
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R.
519, 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342 (S.C.C.).
27
R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 15 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Heywood”].
28
R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Caine”]; R. v. Clay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 80, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clay”].
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prohibiting the erection of temporary nighttime shelters violates the
section 7 rights of homeless people in an overly broad manner.29 The
holding that this by-law was overbroad was predicated on a factual
finding that there were insufficient shelter beds for the number of
homeless people in the city and expert evidence relating to the
“demographic realities”30 of homelessness. The success of this challenge
cannot be solely attributed to the establishment and affirmation of the
overbreadth and gross disproportionality doctrines, but rather it was
fuelled by the compelling nature of legislative fact evidence. Without the
factual anchor the constitutional doctrine had little teeth as Professor
Koshan points out:
Adams is thus a victory under section 7, but like PHS, a limited one.
This is illustrated by a subsequent case, Johnston v Victoria, where the
Court of Appeal declined to find a breach of section 7 where a
homeless person was prevented from erecting a shelter in a park during
the daytime. The Court declared that there was insufficient evidence of
a shortage of adequate daytime shelter for homeless persons in
Victoria, and consequently, was not prepared to find a breach of the
claimant’s life, liberty or security of the person. 31

III. PROVING A VIOLATION
1. Process
Under existing procedural avenues there appears to be three ways in
which one can initiate a challenge to legislative provisions. Of course, if
one is actually charged with an offence under the impugned provision
one can challenge the law in the course of presenting a defence to the
charge. If no charges are pending, a challenge can still be initiated by
interested parties in an application for declaratory relief in the Superior
Court. Finally, in rare cases the federal or provincial government can
refer the question of constitutional validity to a trial or appellate court.32
Regardless of the procedural forum chosen to initiate the challenge,
all three avenues indirectly invite the applicant to extend the evidentiary
29

Adams, supra, note 13.
Jennifer Koshan, “Redressing the Harms of Government (In) Action: A Section 7 Versus
Section 15 Charter Showdown” (2013) 22 Const. Forum Const. 31, at 37.
31
Id., at 38 (citations omitted).
32
Da Silva, “Trial Level References”, supra, note 7.
30
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record to include evidence of impact on third parties. In the context of a
criminal trial, the Big M principle allows the accused to demonstrate
unconstitutionality on the basis of impact on third parties not before the
court. Even if the accused is able to tender evidence relating to the
impact of the law on his or her interests, it would still be strategically
wise to expand the record to include third party impact evidence
especially if the facts of the case, and/or the character of the accused,
may discourage a judge from granting Charter relief. In Bedford, the
Court does suggest that upon proof of a personal violation then
invalidation should follow; however, this suggestion was made in the
context of a case containing a vast record of third party impact evidence,
and it would be unsafe to assume that invalidation will always follow
proof of a personal violation.
With respect to declaratory relief, the criteria for establishing
standing compel an applicant to extend the application to embrace third
party impact evidence. In order to be granted public interest standing
three factors need be considered: (1) whether a serious justiciable issue
has been raised; (2) whether the plaintiff had a real stake or a genuine
interest in the outcome; and (3) whether, having regard to a number of
factors, the proposed application was a reasonable and effective way to
bring the issue before the courts.33 Accordingly, the applicant need not
demonstrate that his or her rights have been violated, but, rather, must
show that he or she has a genuine interest in the rights claim. Having an
interest in an issue gets the applicant through the front door, but it is
unlikely the court will be moved to grant a remedy in the absence of
some showing that other people are adversely impacted by the law. In
fact, the requirement that the applicant must show that there are no other
effective mechanisms to expose the rights claim to judicial review
presupposes that others are affected but are without the resources, a
forum or representation of counsel, making it unlikely that they can
champion the rights claim. In the sex trade cases, a relevant
consideration with respect to public interest standing was the fact that
other individuals who are charged under the impugned provisions are
unable to raise a constitutional claim as it is common practice for the
Crown to withdraw minor criminal charges to insulate the offence from
constitutional challenge.34
33
Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence
Society, [2012] S.C.J. No. 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 534, at 531 (S.C.C.).
34
Id., at 561-62.
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In recent years, challenges brought by way of reference or
declaratory relief have been routinely supported by experiential and
anecdotal evidence from third parties who describe how the law
personally affects their interests. In the Bedford case, the legislative fact
evidence partly comprised anecdotal evidence, called by both the
applicants and Crown, from sex workers as to their experiences in the
sex trade. In the recent polygamy reference case, extensive evidence of
personal experiences within polygamous relationships was introduced,
and in the Little Sisters case (constitutional challenge to the acts
of customs officials) the Court considered evidence from non-party
booksellers as to acts of customs officials with respect to their import
shipments.35
It appears that the approach to public interest standing has been
recently expanded and liberalized;36 however, it must be recognized that,
although a superior court of record has inherent jurisdiction to consider
any constitutional claim, there is a stated preference for leaving
constitutional issues with a trial court.37 Courts are loath to provide
advisory opinions and prefer to litigate Charter issues in the context of a
robust presentation of the adjudicative facts of a case before the courts.38
As the Ontario Court of Appeal has noted: “These cases dictate that
issues, including those with a constitutional dimension, which arise in the
context of a criminal prosecution should routinely be raised and resolved
within the confines of the established criminal process which provides
for a preliminary inquiry (in some cases), a trial, and a full appeal on the
record after that trial.”39 However, this preference for trial adjudication of
constitutional claims rings hollow in many cases in that the adjudicative
facts relating to the elements of an offence charged may bear little
relationship to the constitutional claim being advanced. The routine and
mundane facts which will comprise the adjudicative facts supporting a
criminal charge of communicating for the purpose of prostitution, or
35
Reference re Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, supra, note 14, at paras. 26-51,
59-62, 104-105; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J.
No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, at paras. 8-13 (S.C.C.); Little Sisters BCSC, supra, note 13, at paras.
101-104.
36
Jane Bailey, “Reopening Law’s Gate: Public Interest Standing and Access to Justice”
(2011) 44 U.B.C. L. Rev. 255.
37
R. v. Rahey, [1987] S.C.J. No. 23, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, at 590-91, 595-96, 601-604
(S.C.C.); R. v. Smith, [1989] S.C.J. No. 119, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120, at 1121, 1128-29 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Smith”].
38
R. v. Khan, [2009] O.J. No. 111, 184 C.R.R. (2d) 342 (Ont. S.C.J.).
39
R. v. Johnson, [1991] O.J. No. 481, 3 O.R. (3d) 49, at para. 7 (Ont. C.A.).
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possession of marijuana,40 did very little to illuminate the section 7
claims brought to challenge these offences.
In the criminal trial context, the constitutional challenge will
invariably proceed on the basis of viva voce evidence; whereas, an
application for declaratory relief will proceed on the basis of affidavit
evidence subject to pre-hearing cross-examination before a special
examiner. There is no question that the latter route creates difficulties for
the hearing judge to exercise his or her “gatekeeper”41 function with
respect to the admissibility of expert evidence. To make the gatekeeping
role even more difficult, it is common practice for the parties to compile
a written record of all affidavits and transcripts of cross-examination and
leave issues of admissibility to be determined by the hearing judge in the
absence of the witness.
However, with respect to expert evidence, it is less critical for the
judge to assess the demeanour of the witness in discharging the
gatekeeper function, and the Supreme Court of Canada has now rejected
the proposition that an application hearing judge’s findings on social and
legislative facts, as drawn from a written record, are not entitled to the
same level of deference as findings made by trial judges on adjudicative
facts and viva voce evidence. In Bedford, the Court concluded that “a nodeference standard of appellate review for social and legislative facts
should be rejected. The standard of review for findings of fact —
whether adjudicative, social or legislative — remains palpable and
overriding error.”42 There may be strategic advantages or disadvantages
to consider in choosing to raise a constitutional claim in a trial court or
by way of an application; however, regardless of the route chosen, the
findings of a single judge, made after reviewing an overwhelming array
of legislative fact evidence, will become the established perspective and
understanding of a social problem in the absence of an overriding error
made by the judge.

40
See the adjudicative facts outlined in Caine, supra, note 28, at paras. 8-11; Clay, supra,
note 28, at paras. 5-8; R. v. Skinner, [1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235, at 1240-41 (S.C.C.).
41
R. v. Abbey, [2009] O.J. No. 3534, 2009 ONCA 624, at paras. 55, 76-79 (Ont. C.A.),
leave to appeal refused [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 125 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Sekhon, [2014] S.C.J.
No. 15, 2014 SCC 15, at paras. 46-47 (S.C.C.).
42
Bedford SCC, supra, note 4, at para. 56.
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2. Proof: The Unsupported Hypotheses of Enthusiastic Counsel
Notwithstanding the recent trend of converting court applications
into commissions of inquiries, it must be recognized that many section 7
claims can advance in the absence of any legislative fact evidence. Many
claims will be supported solely by the argument and hypotheses of
enthusiastic counsel. For example, if the section 7 claim is premised on a
deprivation of liberty alone then, in the context of criminal law, there is
no need to call evidence on the deprivation as all criminal offences raise
the possibility of incarceration.43 In addition, the elucidation and
application of the principles of fundamental justice rarely requires
evidence as this task largely concerns reasoned argument over the
significance of a legal principle. The seminal cases establishing a
minimum standard of fault under section 7 did not require any legislative
fact evidence, and these cases were resolved by the judicial creation of
an abstract standard and an interpretation of the impugned provisions to
determine if this standard had been met.44 Similarly, the section 7
overbreadth and vagueness challenges all proceeded as a matter of
statutory interpretation and judicial construction of the purpose of the
legislation — neither task requiring the presentation of legislative fact
evidence.45
Even when the violation requires a demonstration of a deprivation of
security on the basis of arbitrariness or gross disproportionality it may
not be necessary to call legislative fact evidence. Sometimes the proof of
a constitutionally adverse effect of law can be a matter of reasoned
argument and simple common sense. Scientific and empirical inquiry
will usually play a critical role, but, in some circumstances, common
sense should come into play if science has yet to provide a conclusive
resolution. For example, in RJR-McDonald the Court needed to reach a
factual finding as to whether advertising increased consumption of a
product (i.e., cigarettes). The scientific studies presented to the Court
were not resolute or determinative of the issue and the Court relied upon
If the liberty claim is based upon the rarely successful “fundamental personal decision”
argument then in all likelihood legislative fact evidence would be called to demonstrate whether
there is cultural, social or historical support for the characterization of the decision as fundamental.
44
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, 68 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 281
(S.C.C.); R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ruzic, [2001]
S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.).
45
For overbroad, see Heywood, supra, note 27; R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004]
2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.). For vagueness, see Prostitution Reference, supra, note 21; R. v. Morales,
[1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
43
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the “powerful common sense observation” that companies would not
spend millions on advertising if they did not believe that it would
increase consumption of their products.46 The Court recognized that the
exercise of proving the effects of law cannot be seen as a pure scientific
inquiry as “predictions respecting the ramifications of legal rules upon
the social and economic order are not matters of precise measurement,
and are often ‘the product of a mix of conjecture, fragmentary
knowledge, general experience and knowledge of the needs, aspirations
and resources of society, and other components’”.47 The Court’s
characterization of this exercise suggests that common sense may be
more significant than a scientific measurement of causality in some cases.
Reliance upon common sense is often expressed through the concept
of proving a violation by the use of reasonable hypotheticals. Although
the Supreme Court of Canada has warned that constitutional issues
should not be argued in an “evidentiary vacuum” and that a constitutional
challenge be fully animated by the relevant adjudicative and legislative
facts, the Court has also permitted challenges to laws to proceed on the
basis of speculation and hypothesis relating to how the law could
potentially violate Charter rights. The reasonable hypothetical
methodology was first used for demonstrating that a mandatory
minimum sentence could constitute a cruel and unusual punishment as
applied to a hypothetical accused,48 but it has since been applied to
other section 7 claims relating to full answer and defence and
overbreadth (but not to vagueness challenges).49 Demonstrating that a
law is unconstitutional in terms of its effects on the basis of its potential
application and operation is an acceptable mode of proof unless the
hypotheticals are “far-fetched”, “remote” or “marginally imaginable”.50
In a challenge to the legislative means to achieve a state objective,
whether by invoking arbitrariness, overbreadth or gross disproportionality,
46

RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3
S.C.R. 199, at paras. 84, 184 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RJR-McDonald”]; Chaoulli, supra, note 13,
at paras. 136-137.
47
RJR-MacDonald, id., at para. 67.
48
Smith, supra, note 37; R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at
paras. 50-53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”]; R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R.
485 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Goltz”].
49
Heywood, supra, note 27, at para. 62; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R.
668, at paras. 40-42 (S.C.C.); Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] S.C.J. No. 62, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 1031 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Pacific Ltd.”]; Mussani v. College of Physicians and
Surgeons of Ontario, [2004] O.J. No. 5176, 74 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 75 (Ont. C.A.).
50
Goltz, supra, note 48, at para. 42; Morrisey, supra, note 48, at para. 30.

632

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

it will be necessary for the Court to undertake a proportionality analysis.
Although the use of reasonable hypotheticals has been used primarily with
respect to section 12 claims of cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme
Court of Canada has noted that constitutional adjudication by means of
“reasonable hypotheticals” is necessary and ideally suited for the
assessment of proportionality:
Where a party alleges that a law is overbroad, or that punishment is
cruel and unusual, a court must engage in proportionality analysis. In
Goltz, supra, for example, I discussed the test for determining
violations of s. 12 of the Charter, and stated, at p. 498, “that a sentence
which is grossly or excessively disproportionate to the wrongdoing
would infringe s. 12”. Cory J. asserted a similar proportionality test in
Heywood, supra, at p. 793: “The effect of overbreadth is that in some
applications the law is arbitrary or disproportionate”.
Proportionality analysis involves an assessment of whether a law, the
terms of which are not vague, applies in a proportionate manner to a
particular fact situation. Inevitably, courts will be required to compare
the law with the facts. In that situation, the use of reasonable
hypotheticals will be of assistance, and may be unavoidable … . 51

Recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal struggled with the question of
how and when reasonable hypotheticals can be employed in the context
of a section 12 Charter claim being brought with respect to a minimum
sentence for possession of a loaded firearm. The Court outlined the
proper approach to this mode of argumentation:
The reasonable hypothetical … describes those cases that fall within
the broad mainstream of fact situations contemplated by the terms of
the offence in issue. Fact situations that represent true outliers, the
“remote or extreme examples”, may, if and when they arise, give rise to
an argument that the mandatory minimum is unconstitutional as applied
to the specific accused and, therefore, of no force or effect. Those
extreme examples cannot, however, be used as reasonable
hypotheticals to strike down mandatory minimums in cases where the
minimum as applied to the specific accused does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. After Goltz, the reasonable hypothetical
designed to capture every “lurking” possibility in Smith had been
narrowed to capture those possibilities that “could commonly arise”. 52

51

Canadian Pacific Ltd., supra, note 49, at paras. 80-81.
R. v. Nur, [2013] O.J. No. 5120, 2013 ONCA 677, at para. 122 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal granted [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 17 (S.C.C.).
52
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If a constitutional violation is to be proved by way of reasonable
hypothetical the courts will insist that the hypothetical describes potential
factual scenarios that could commonly arise with respect to the law being
challenged. This suggests that the courts are reluctant to invalidate
legislation if the only constitutionally adverse impact is restricted to
unique situations unlikely to recur. The Supreme Court in Bedford may
have suggested that invalidation flows from proof of a violation of the
rights of a solitary applicant (or a hypothetical applicant in a Big M
challenge); yet the thrust of a reasonable hypothetical approach to
proving the violation is designed to show that the adverse impact of the
law has the potential to apply to situations which “commonly arise”.
Even when the resolution of the constitutional issue demands the
introduction of legislative fact evidence, it will not always be necessary
to introduce this evidence through the vehicle of a witness, whether viva
voce or by affidavit. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that “[t]he
usual vehicle for reception of legislative facts is judicial notice, which
requires that the ‘facts’ be so notorious or uncontroversial that evidence
of their existence is unnecessary.”53 Reliance upon judicial notice
obviates the need to call a witness to prove the uncontroversial fact;
however, the Court also warned that “[t]he concept of ‘legislative fact’
does not, however, provide an excuse to put before the court
controversial evidence to the prejudice of the opposing party without
providing a proper opportunity for its truth to be tested.”54
Although the concept of judicial notice can be difficult to apply, the
concept can be simply stated: “a court may properly take judicial notice
of facts that are either: (1) so notorious or generally accepted as not to be
the subject of debate among reasonable persons; or (2) capable of
immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible
sources of indisputable accuracy”.55 It is important to note that this
criteria for admission is further relaxed when the evidence being
tendered is not dispositive of the issues raised at the trial or hearing. As
the Supreme Court has noted, the permissible scope of judicial notice
varies according to the nature of the issue under consideration, and the

53
Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), [2000] S.C.J.
No. 2, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 44, 250 A.R. 314, at para. 5 (S.C.C.).
54
Id.
55
R. v. Find, [2001] S.C.J. No. 34, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863, at para. 48 (S.C.C.); R. v. Spence,
[2005] S.C.J. No. 74, 2005 SCC 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458, at para. 53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spence”].
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closer a fact approaches the dispositive issue the more a court ought to
insist on compliance with the stricter criteria for judicial recognition.56
Evidence-based research studies, whether in the natural or social
sciences, which focus on and explore the behavioural and societal effects
of law do not fit comfortably into the concept of judicial notice.57 Rarely
would a study of any nature be considered “so notorious or generally
accepted as not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons”. It
may be that in some cases decades of well-known research crystallizes
into a fact beyond debate as was the case when the court in Vriend
concluded that “I am satisfied that the discrimination homosexuals suffer
is so notorious that I can take judicial notice of it without evidence”.58
However, one would think that in most cases judicial notice would not be
of much assistance in proving the unconstitutional effects of law.
When the Supreme Court notes that “the usual vehicle for reception
of legislative facts is judicial notice” it is most likely referring to the
tendering of government reports without the need to call the author, or
committee members, as witnesses. On a consistent and routine basis, the
litigants and the courts have relied upon government reports without
supporting witnesses for the purpose of elucidating legislative objectives
and to provide evidence of the effects of legislation. Even a cursory
review of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the Charter era reveals
extensive reliance on government reports to establish a wide array of
legislative facts.59 Government reports may not always be “generally
56

Spence, id., at paras. 60, 61; Find, id.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada in Spence indicated that the test for
judicial notice will become somewhat more “elastic” when the Court is dealing with legislative facts.
The test does not change when the Court is receiving legislative fact evidence, but it is clear that due
to the speculative nature of legislative fact evidence it is impossible to apply the test with the same
rigour (Spence, id.).
58
Vriend v. Alberta, [1994] A.J. No. 272, [1994] 6 W.W.R. 414, at para. 12 (Alta. Q.B.),
revd [1996] A.J. No. 182 (Alta. C.A.), affd [1998] S.C.C. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.).
59
Consider the following diverse examples: In R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1
S.C.R. 452, at 484, 493, 513-14 (S.C.C.), the Court relied on the Fraser Report and the MacGuigan
Report to elucidate legislative purpose and the effects of viewing pornography. In Caine, supra, note
28, at paras, 3, 21, 44, 55-56, 58, 195-196, the Court relied on the Le Dain Report and reports of the
Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs and the House of Commons Special Committee on NonMedical Use of Drugs for discerning legislative purpose, demographics of marijuana users, and the
effects of marijuana use. In Moge v. Moge, [1992] S.C.J. No. 107, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at 854-56,
863-64 (S.C.C.), the Court relied on three Statistics Canada reports, the 1990 Department of Justice
Evaluation of the Divorce Act, and the 1990 Women and Poverty Revisited report with respect to the
demographics of single mothers and the economic impact of divorce. In R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J.
No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at paras. 55-59 (S.C.C.), the Court relied upon the 1967 report Indians
and the Law, the 1987 Canadian Sentencing Commission report, a report of the House of Commons
57
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accepted” and beyond debate; however, evidence-based studies of law
are few and far between, and a focused inquiry by lawmakers and their
agents into the effects of law may be the only evidence readily available
to supplement common sense and reasonable hypotheticals.
If there does not exist government reports or governmentcommissioned studies, simple reliance upon common sense and
reasonable hypotheticals may not be sufficiently powerful to provide the
court with the impetus to invalidate a challenged law. In Bedford, the
factual questions underlying the constitutional argument could have been
answered with common sense and reasonable hypothetical argument.
Although the policy issues surrounding many aspects of the sex trade are
controversial, divisive and the subject-matter of endless debate, it must
be remembered that the factual issue raised in the case was far more
simple: can safety be enhanced by moving indoors, recruiting assistance
and communicating with clients? It seems that this question could be
answered easily based upon common sense; nonetheless, it is hard to
imagine the Court invalidating the sex trade provisions without the
accompanying record of empirical study, experiential opinion and
government-commissioned reports, which all spoke to the increased risk
of violence faced by sex workers operating in the current legal regime.
In theory a law can be invalidated on the basis of abstractions and
hypotheticals; however, in practice there will usually be some underlying
resistance to striking a law on the basis of potential and not actual
effects. Professor Hogg identifies one source of this resistance in his
assessment of the overbreadth doctrine:
Why should the Supreme Court of Canada be in such a hurry to strike
down a law for overshooting its purpose in a case where the law is
clearly accomplishing its purpose? After all, if the hypothetical cases
are realistic, there will be future opportunities to review the law when it
is applied too broadly. The reliance on hypothetical cases turns the
courts into “roving commissions assigned to pass judgement on the
validity of the Nation’s laws”. The American courts have not allowed
this to happen. In the United States, it is well established that “a person

Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General, a 1997 Federal/Provincial/Territorial report on
population growth in prisons, and the five-year review of the Corrections and Conditional Release
Act in evaluating the disproportionate impact of the criminal justice system on Aboriginal persons.
In Reference re Unemployment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 669, at paras. 19-20, 31, 64, 72 (S.C.C.), the Court relied on the Rowell-Sirois Report, the
Gill Report, the Cousineau Report, the Boyer Report and the Forget Report to reach conclusions
about the systemic discrimination of women under the Unemployment Insurance regime.
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to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to
challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the court”.
Surely, this reflects a more appropriately restrained role for the courts.60

To overcome this resistance a litigant should move beyond hypothetical
argument and develop the legislative face evidence as this type of
evidence often demonstrates how the adverse impact of law on third
parties is not just a potential outcome but is actually taking place on a
recurring basis.
3. Proof: Legislative Fact Evidence
The genesis for proving constitutional violations on the basis of
social science research is the “Brandeis Brief”. For Louis Brandeis, “it
was essential … that legal analysis proceed through an understanding of
social facts” and not merely through legal formalism in order to properly
adjudicate the merits of the case.61 Further, in his view, the introduction
of social facts would allow the judiciary to break from rigid tradition of
stare decisis by assessing new and changing situations, allowing the
judiciary to apply the law in a manner that appropriately responded to the
relevant issues of the day.62 In 1908, Brandeis successfully represented
the state in defending hours-of-work legislation in Muller v. Oregon,63 by
submitting what is referred to as a “Brandeis Brief”. The brief comprised
two pages of legal argument, accompanied by over 100 pages of
sociological data demonstrating the detrimental link between women’s
poor health and their long working hours.64 The Brandeis Brief continues
to be used on a frequent basis in American constitutional litigation.
Michael Walsh lists a number of contemporary instances where briefs
were submitted — to challenge the Federal Death Penalty Act, in

60
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., vol. 2, loose-leaf (consulted
March 2014) (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2007), at 47-54 [hereinafter “Hogg,
Constitutional Law”].
61
Edward A. Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power,
and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2000), at 166-67.
62
Stephen W. Baskerville, Of Laws and Limitations: An Intellectual Portrait of Louis
Dembitz Brandeis (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994), at 234-35.
63
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
64
Reynolds Hedland Blankenship Jr., “Comments: Time, Place, and Manner Analysis, Brandeis
Briefs, and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003” (2004) 50 Loy. L. Rev. 173, at 201.
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critique of the insanity defence, to analyze racial patterns in prosecutors’
jury selection and, most notably, to challenge racial segregation in
schools.65 Professor Hogg notes that the Brandeis Brief
seems to rest on an expanded notion of judicial notice. The courts take
notice of the state of expert knowledge in a field of social science, even
though the facts do not have the indisputable character that is the
traditional prerequisite for judicial notice. As a practical matter, the
Brandeis brief can expose the court to a broad canvass of the state of
social-science knowledge without the parties incurring the costs
associated with a trial involving a lengthy parade of expert witnesses. 66

Professor Hogg also notes that American jurisprudence has not
developed any clear rules regarding Brandeis Briefs, such as what are the
appropriate forms of evidence, the procedures for rebuttal, or how much
weight should be accorded to this evidence.67 A similar criticism can be
made of the current Canadian approach to legislative fact evidence in
that it is clear that the Brandeis Brief approach to legislative fact
evidence permits the tendering of government reports by way of judicial
notice, but beyond that stipulation there is a lack of clarity and
consistency with respect to the nature, scope and manner of admitting
legislative fact evidence in Canadian constitutional litigation.
The Supreme Court of Canada may not have provided much
guidance as to when and how legislative fact evidence should be
introduced, but it has provided a clear definition of what legislative fact
evidence entails:
It is necessary to draw a distinction at the outset between two
categories of facts in constitutional litigation: “adjudicative facts” and
“legislative facts”. These terms derive from Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise (1958), vol. 2, para. 15.03, p. 353. (See also Morgan, “Proof of
Facts in Charter Litigation”, in Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation (1987).)
Adjudicative facts are those that concern the immediate parties: in
Davis’s words, “who did what, where, when, how and with what
motive or intent ....” Such facts are specific, and must be proved by
admissible evidence. Legislative facts are those that establish the
purpose and background of legislation, including its social, economic

65
66
67

Michael Walsh, “The Grammatical Lawyer”, The Practical Lawyer 54:3 (June 2008).
Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra, note 60, at 60-14 (citations omitted).
Id.
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and cultural context. Such facts are of a more general nature, and are
subject to less stringent admissibility requirements … . 68

The proposition that “such facts … are subject to less stringent
admissibility requirements” does not mean that the rules of evidence are
recklessly abandoned, and it is most likely a reference to the established
principle that the usual vehicle for admission of these facts would be
through judicial notice without the need to call a supporting witness. The
extent to which the ordinary rules for admissibility are abandoned or
altered remains unclear; however, in 2007 the B.C. Supreme Court
provided this helpful summary of the state of the law governing
legislative fact evidence:
1.

Legislative facts relate to the constitutionality of legislation or
policy. They should not relate to the adjudication of the matters in
issue (“adjudicative facts”) but rather to the socio/economic
framework within which that adjudication takes place.

2.

Legislative facts establish the purpose and background of
legislation, the social and economic conditions under which it is
enacted, the mischief at which it is directed and the institutional
framework in which it is to operate.

3.

Examples of materials admitted under the legislative facts rule
include reports of parliamentary committees, Law Reform
Commission reports, white papers, green papers, Royal
Commission reports, government reports and independently
commissioned studies relied upon by government.

4.

Legislative facts are an expanded form of judicial notice but they
may not have the indisputable character traditionally required for
judicial notice.

5.

The permissible scope of judicial notice should vary according to
the nature of the issue under consideration. The closer
the legislative fact is to the subject of dispute, the more it should be
notorious and accurate because it can become determinative. If
the legislative fact simply forms part of the context in which the
dispute is to be resolved, then its reliability, accuracy and notoriety
is of less concern.

6.

Where the legislative facts may be disputed, they should be proved
by the opinion of expert witnesses in the relevant field of

68
Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 92, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at
para. 27 (S.C.C.).
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knowledge. The expert can be cross-examined or contradicted by
another expert witness as to the value and weight to be given to
certain reports. The result is some assurance of reliability for
factual findings of controverted legislative facts.
7.

Studies done after enactment of legislation can be legislative
fact used to analyze the legislation.69

In the early Charter days, legislative fact evidence was tendered
without any real consideration of its probative value and constitutional
significance. If the litigants did not object to the admission of the
evidence then there would not be any critical assessment of the value of
this evidence. The evidence might be dispositive of some issue in
question or it may simply have constituted background information of
interest but of no real import. The evidence was simply admitted without
critical assessment. As Lokan and Dassios note about the early days:
The high water mark of this “early liberal approach” was R.W.D.S.U.,
Locals 544, 496, 635, 955 v. Saskatchewan, where Dickson C.J.C., in a
concurring judgment, cited newspaper articles to establish that a publicsector strike by dairy workers would harm the public by disrupting the
milk supply. In retrospect, some early debates about important issues of
public policy appear to have taken place in a relative factual vacuum, as
the courts and counsel struggled to find their way in the unfamiliar
territory of the Charter. 70

In retrospect, the casual and flexible approach to admitting social
science data and other research materials undercuts the objective of
admitting this evidence to provide the decision-maker with an informed
basis upon which to review public policy. Untested, voluminous but
selective data does not bode well for an informed decision. It is
disconcerting that in the late 1980s many provisions relating to impaired
driving, which had been found to be constitutionally deficient, were
upheld as reasonable limits on the basis of a selective and unchallenged
introduction of legislative fact evidence by the Crown:
Crown counsel submitted seven volumes of material in support of his
submission that any restraint under s. 234.1 was a reasonable limit
prescribed by law within s. 1 of the Charter. The material consisted of

Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General), [2007] B.C.J. No. 1342,
2007 BCSC 858, at para. 2 (B.C.S.C.).
70
Andrew K. Lokan & Christopher M. Dassios, Constitutional Litigation in Canada
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006), at 8-6, 8-7 [hereinafter “Lokan & Dassios”].
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the legislative history of this enactment in the Code, including extracts
from Hansard at the time the various amendments to the Code were
introduced into Parliament by the Minister of Justice; a volume of
statistics showing a causal relationship between driving while under the
influence of alcohol and the severity of accidents; surveys and studies
on the problem of driving after drinking; a report on the effectiveness
of roadside testing in detecting the drinking driver; various research
papers on the problem, including a research paper prepared specifically
for the purposes of this appeal, and a volume on American and English
case and statute law.
Counsel for the appellant did not object to the introduction of this
material at this level.71

There is no question that “by 1989, the Supreme Court perceived the
need to send a sharp signal that it required a more reliable and more
extensive information base upon which to make momentous decisions of
public policy”;72 however, this signal has not been accompanied by any
guidelines or direction. There have been few cases in which legislative
fact evidence is subjected to a critical analysis of admissibility and
probative value;73 however, the Bedford case actually did provide this
opportunity for critical analysis by the Supreme Court of Canada as the
application hearing judge relied extensively and explicitly on most of the
legislative fact evidence introduced by all litigants. This opportunity was
lost as the Court ruled that deference to the lower court findings would be
the proper approach to this evidence and as a result the Court made little or
no mention of legislative fact evidence as it applied to the law’s impact on
third parties. The Court focused on the adjudicative facts introduced by the
three applicants and relegated third party impact evidence to the category of
interesting but marginally relevant evidence.74
71

R. v. Seo, [1986] O.J. No. 178, 54 O.R. (2d) 293, at paras. 21-22 (Ont. C.A.).
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73
For one case in which an application was made to strike legislative fact evidence, see
Chaudhary v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2012] O.J. No. 1542, 2012 ONSC 1936 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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(a constitutional duty under s. 7 to preserve evidence in a post-conviction setting): Chaudhary v.
Ontario (Attorney General), [2012] O.J. No. 4422, 2012 ONSC 5023 (Ont. S.C.J.), affd [2013] O.J.
No. 4616, 2013 ONCA 615 (Ont. C.A.). See also Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman, [1993]
O.J. No. 1792, 14 O.R. (3d) 697 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
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Earlier in the paper it was noted that some of the recent
constitutional challenges have proceeded with a vast evidentiary record
rivalling the scope of evidence tendered at a commission of inquiry or
legislative committee hearing. A great deal of this evidence is admitted
on the basis of judicial notice. Although Professor Hogg speaks
approvingly of the Brandeis Brief approach because it can “expose the
court to a broad canvas of the state of social-science knowledge without
the parties incurring the costs associated with a trial involving a lengthy
parade of expert witnesses”, he still expresses concern over the recent
growth of evidence-based challenges:
Evidence in Charter cases gives rise to many problems. One is … that
the validity or invalidity of a law will often turn on the state of the
evidentiary record at trial. Another problem is cost. A parade of expert
witnesses is extremely costly, and this cost is borne not just by the
defending government, but also by the challenger, who, although not
bearing the burden of proof, must in all prudence adduce evidence to
rebut the government’s evidence of justification. Another problem is
that, in the realm of public policy, cogent social-science evidence often
does not exist for a perceived harm, and yet the legislators do have a
“reasoned apprehension of harm”. For these reasons, in my opinion, it
would be desirable for Charter review to become less dependent on
evidence, even if the courts have to strain somewhat to make “obvious”
or “self-evident” findings.75

Reliance upon legislative fact evidence is a mixed blessing. On the
one hand, a comprehensive record of available research should enhance
informed decision-making. On the other hand a decision-maker may find
the voluminous record overwhelming and insufficiently tested for
probative value. In addition, echoing the concerns of Professor Hogg,
Justice La Forest has noted that “it is undesirable that an Act be found
constitutional today and unconstitutional tomorrow simply on the basis
of the particular evidence of broad social and economic facts that
happens to have been presented by counsel.”76 On balance, the value of
making a decision in a proper socio-political context is too significant for
establishing the decision’s legitimacy and authority to propose restricting
the scope of legislative fact evidence. Nonetheless, it is incumbent upon
the Court to provide better guidance with respect to the criteria for
admissibility and evaluation of legislative fact evidence. When operating
75
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Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra, note 60, at 38-8 – 38-9.
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within the current legal framework of an adversarial approach to proof,
there is greater risk that the legislative fact evidence could lead to a badly
informed decision despite the appearance of being fully informed.

IV. THE FUTURE OF EVIDENCE-BASED CHALLENGES
In another paper I have argued that rigorous substantive review of
legislation by the judiciary is both warranted and justified in light of the
dysfunctional and political nature of criminal law reform.77 Assuming
that the judiciary does need to take an activist and ambitious role in
reviewing legislation, one must not idealize the judicial function.
Ambition must be supported by some degree of competence, and it is
hard to know whether judges have the requisite skills and abilities to
assess contentious social science data and evaluate the significance of
wide-ranging and untested legislative fact evidence. Establishing a clear
and non-contentious set of facts to provide the foundation for public
policy decision-making can be a daunting task, whether undertaken by
the legislature or judiciary, and undertaking this exercise within the
framework of adversarial justice further complicates the process.
To state the obvious, judicial decision-making is a fallible, human
enterprise. The judiciary clearly has experience and expertise in
assessing the who, what, when, where and how of adjudicative facts, but,
even within this comfort zone, the saga of wrongful convictions
demonstrate how courts can err in making findings of adjudicative facts.
The fallibility of this process is increased when a court goes beyond its
comfort zone and is required to make findings of legislative fact
pertaining to the effects of law on personal behaviour and society at
large.78
Outside of the realm of adjudicative facts we have at least one
infamous example of the dangers or pitfalls of making constitutional
determinations based upon statistics and social science studies. In 1990,
the Supreme Court of Canada determined that the right to be tried within
a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter required that a trial
in the lower courts be completed within six to eight months of the charge
being laid. This proscription was based on an extensive review of
Alan N. Young, “Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the Minimum Content
of Criminal Law” in J. Cameron & J. Stribopoulos, eds. (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 441, at 447-60.
78
Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron, eds., The Use, Non-Use, Misuse of Applied Social
Research in the Courts (Cambridge, MA: Abt Books Inc., 1980).
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statistical data relating to disposition times in various jurisdictions. As a
result of this ruling, 50,000 charges in Ontario were stayed for
unreasonable delay. Subsequent to the decision it was discovered that the
statistics had been misinterpreted and misapplied by the Court,79 and two
years later the Court modified its prescription in recognition of the error:
With respect to the use of statistics, care must be taken that a comparison
of jurisdictions is indeed a comparative analysis. For example, in Askov
we were given statistics with respect to Montreal in an affidavit by
Professor Baar. Subsequently, it was brought to our attention that this
was a misleading comparison. Evidence was led in this appeal showing
that the manner in which criminal charges are dealt with in Montreal and
Brampton is sufficiently dissimilar so as to make statistics drawn from
the two jurisdictions of limited comparative value.80

Innocent misinterpretation of research data will always be a
possibility; however, when one enters an area of contentious moral,
social and political debate, the risk of error is no longer restricted to
innocent misrepresentation. The Court is now being asked to assess data
often prepared and presented by activists. Professor Best aptly describes
this pitfall:
Social statistics describe society, but they are also products of our social
arrangements. The people who bring social statistics to our attention have
reasons for doing so; they inevitably want something, just as reporters
and the other media figures who repeat and publicize statistics have their
own goals. Statistics are tools, used for particular purposes … . Statistics,
then, can become weapons in political struggles … . Certainly, we need
to understand that people debating social problems choose statistics
selectively and present them to support their points of view.81

This pitfall is well recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada and
the Court does approach social science data with some caution. In 1999,
in the context of a claim of discrimination against same-sex couples, the
Court noted:

79
Carl Baar, “Court Delay Data as Social Science Evidence: The Supreme Court of Canada
and ‘Trial Within a Reasonable Time’” (1997) 19 Justice System J. 123; Carl Baar, “Criminal Court
Delay and the Charter: The Use and Misuse of Social Facts in Judicial Policy” (1993) 72 Can. Bar
Rev. 305.
80
R. v. Morin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 25, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, at para. 51 (S.C.C.).
81
Joel Best, Damned Lies and Statistics: Untangling Numbers from the Media, Politicians,
and Activists (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), at 7, 10, 18.
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I have been greatly aided in my consideration of the existing social
science evidence by the voluminous Brandeis briefs and articles submitted
by the respondent. While this evidence is an important source of
information for this Court, I must stress that care should be taken with
social science data. When dealing with studies exploring the general
characteristics of a socially disadvantaged group, a court should be
cautious not to adopt conclusions that may in fact be based on, or
influenced by, the very discrimination that the courts are bound to
eradicate. Judges, in fact, should be diligent in examining all social science
material for experimental, systemic or political bias of any kind. With this
caution in mind, I will briefly consider the material before this Court.82

The examination of “all social science materials for experimental,
systemic and political bias of any kind” is critical but it is easier said than
done. Without a background in statistical method, and without
knowledge of the basic principles and practices of qualitative or
quantitative research, the critical examination might be nothing more
than a superficial appraisal.
Nonetheless, in the context of the sex work challenge, it did appear
as if the application hearing judge was ready, willing and able to
critically examine research studies. The government had tendered
numerous studies with troubling conclusions relating to the demographic
background of sex workers. The witnesses introducing this evidence
presented the data as definitive and conclusive despite the fact that sex
workers are considered a “hard to reach” population for the purposes of
statistical study.83 Much of the evidence was fraught with methodological
shortcomings and largely comprised gross overgeneralizations and
ideological conclusions masked as science.84 Exercising the gatekeeper
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Frances Shaver, “Sex Work Research: Methodological and Ethical Challenges” (2005) 20
Journal of Interpersonal Violence 296; Cecilia Benoit et al., “Community-Academic Research on
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It is interesting to note the critique presented by the applicants in Bedford with respect to
the value of the empirical evidence presented by the Crown. Some of this was adopted by the
application hearing judge but most of the critique was not addressed in the various judgments. A
fuller critique of the problems with the witness/activists can be found in the Superior Court factum
of the Applicant, see Bedford ONSC, supra, note 13 (Factum of the Applicants, at paras. 276-330),
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function the application hearing judge critically assessed this evidence
and placed little weight on it. She noted:
In reviewing the extensive record presented, I was struck by the fact
that many of those proffered as experts to provide international
evidence to this court had entered the realm of advocacy and had given
evidence in a manner that was designed to persuade rather than assist
the court. For example, some experts made bold assertions without
properly outlined bases for their claims and were unwilling to qualify
their opinions in the face of new facts provided. While it is natural for
persons immersed in a field of study to begin to take positions as a
result of their research over time, where these witnesses act primarily
as advocates, their opinions are of lesser value to the court.
...
I found the evidence of Dr. Melissa Farley to be problematic. Although
Dr. Farley has conducted a great deal of research on prostitution, her
advocacy appears to have permeated her opinions. For example,
Dr. Farley’s unqualified assertion in her affidavit that prostitution is
inherently violent appears to contradict her own findings that prostitutes
who work from indoor locations generally experience less violence.
Furthermore, in her affidavit, she failed to qualify her opinion regarding the
causal relationship between post-traumatic stress disorder and prostitution,
namely, that it could be caused by events unrelated to prostitution.
Dr. Farley’s choice of language is at times inflammatory and detracts
from her conclusions.85

On the one hand, the Court’s critical assessment in this case provides
some confidence for believing that the judiciary is ready, willing and able
to work with social science data; however, it may also simply be a
reflection that, due to the political divisiveness of the sex trade issue, the
lack of neutrality among expert witnesses is very transparent and easily
detected in this context. For example, as the Bedford case was slowly
moving its way to the Supreme Court of Canada, a human trafficking
prosecution proceeded in Ontario in which the Crown tried to qualify
Professor Benjamin Perrin as an expert witness in human trafficking and
the recruitment techniques of traffickers. The trial judge refused to
qualify Professor Perrin as an expert stating that:
The probative value of the proposed evidence is questionable. Much
of Professor’s Perrin’s observations are one sided and second hand: his
85
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study was limited to interviews of approximately fifty individuals in
government, law enforcement and NGO capacities, as well as the
analysis of Access to Information filings from various government
departments; moreover, his research did not involve field work, clinical
studies, or, most importantly, direct interaction with either the victims
of sex trafficking or sex worker advocacy groups.
Further, Professor Perrin is a career advocate, and does not provide
the appearance of objectivity. While his efforts to end human
trafficking and raise consciousness about this issue are doubtless
laudable, his professional life is anchored in his role as advocate for the
victims of sex trafficking and lobbyist for policy change in government.
He has publicly stated that in his view sex work should not be
decriminalized. His testimony would not be that of an objective
academic but rather a dedicated lobbyist. 86

Proving a violation by reliance upon legislative fact evidence
presents both the court and the litigants with a difficult choice. Allowing
this evidence to be introduced informally through the vehicle of judicial
notice facilitates and enhances access to justice by significantly reducing
the cost and time needed to launch an effective constitutional challenge.
However, the greater the reliance upon judicial notice as the vehicle for
admission, the greater the risk of distortion and mistake. The critical
assessments noted above with respect to witnesses in the sex worker
cases followed the testing of the witnesses’ evidence through crossexamination, either in court or before a special examiner. Without the
testing of this evidence a court may have ended up taking judicial notice
of unsubstantiated and methodologically unsound conclusions. In the
quest to educate and inform the judiciary with a comprehensive
evidentiary record, a choice may have to be made between prioritizing
access to justice or enhancing accuracy of fact-finding.
When the Supreme Court in Bedford noted that Charter relief by way
of invalidation will be granted upon proof of a violation of one person’s
rights the Court may have been implicitly expressing a concern with the
recent practice of proving violations with Brandeis briefs of monumental
proportions. In light of a court’s limits in terms of assessing the value and
significance of social science research, the tendering of hundreds of
thousands of pages of documentary evidence will not enhance a court’s
fact-finding potential, but rather will just muddy the waters. It is far
simpler, and more accurate, for a court to determine whether one
86
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person’s rights have been violated based upon the adjudicative facts of
this person’s life and experience.
Even with the shortcomings involved in making findings of law’s
causality and other social facts based upon a selective record of research
studies, it is hard to imagine a court invalidating legislation solely on the
basis that it violates the rights of one claimant. Despite the language
employed by the Court in Bedford, the communication, living on avails
and bawdy house provisions were not invalidated solely because the
record showed that the applicants, Bedford, Scott and Lebovitch had
legitimate rights claims. Whether the Court implicitly relied upon
common sense, reasonable hypotheticals or the voluminous legislative
fact evidence, the Court could reach the conclusion that invalidation was
warranted because the rights claims of the applicants did not merely arise
out of their unique life experiences. When the evidence and argument in
a constitutional claim extends beyond the impact on the applicant, the
foundation for invalidation is strengthened as this drastic remedy is not
being employed to address a law that was only “peripherally
problematic”.
Conceptually it makes far more sense to provide a personal remedy
under section 24(1) of the Charter when an applicant can demonstrate
that his or her rights have been violated and to grant the drastic remedy
of invalidation when there exists legislative fact evidence or reasonable
hypotheticals demonstrating that many others may be adversely impacted
by the law. In suggesting that invalidation is the appropriate response to
the rights claim of a uniquely situated claimant the Court is playing a
high stakes game that can end up stultifying the growth of rights as “the
drastic nature of such a remedy may implicitly influence how the court
interprets the underlying rights”.87 One need only examine the evolution
of the “abuse of process” doctrine in criminal law to see how the
looming presence of the “drastic”88 remedy of a stay of proceeding has
rendered the doctrine toothless and of little practical impact.
When a rights claim is unique the obvious choice of a personal
remedy would be a constitutional exemption. In the United States, an
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individual can launch an “as-applied” challenge in addition to a facial
challenge — the as-applied challenge “targets the constitutionality of the
statute as it is applied in the particular context of the case, and seeks to
invalidate it only as applied to those circumstances”.89 This nuanced
approach lowers the stakes of our zero-sum invalidation game.
Unfortunately, this approach appears to be foreclosed by the Supreme
Court’s consistent rejection of constitutional exemptions. A constitutional
exemption under section 24(1), in lieu of the remedy of invalidation
under section 52, is the equivalent of the “as-applied” form of
constitutional review, but the Court has consistently frowned upon this
alternative remedy.90 Most recently, the Court stated, “such exemptions
are to be avoided”91 for the reasons cited in Ferguson: “(1) the
jurisprudence; (2) the need to avoid intruding on the role of Parliament;
(3) the remedial scheme of the Charter; and (4) the impact of granting
constitutional exemptions in mandatory sentence cases on the values
underlying the rule of law”.92 In a nutshell, the Court viewed
constitutional exemptions as being a more intrusive remedy than an
invalidation because the creation of an exemption undermines and
undercuts Parliament’s purpose in enacting the legislation.
When a constitutional challenge is advanced in the absence of any
evidence of third party and societal impact, the remedy of invalidation
suffers from the proverbial problem of throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. If the Court does not revisit its stance on constitutional
exemptions it will have few tools in its remedial arsenal to respond in a
principled and meaningful way to legislation that is “substantially
constitutionally and peripherally problematic”.
The Court would still have as an option the remedy of reading down
or reading in as a more nuanced remedy with respect to peripherally
problematic legislation. The Court has addressed constitutionally flawed
provisions dealing with child pornography,93 the use of force to discipline
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children94 and court-ordered medical treatment for minors95 by
performing cosmetic surgery by way of statutory interpretation or the
reading in of exemptions to the existing provisions. In fact, this remedy
was available to the Supreme Court of Canada in Bedford as the Court of
Appeal for Ontario held that the appropriate response to the
constitutional overbreadth of the living on the avail offence was to read
in a requirement of proving “circumstances of exploitation” in addition
to the statutory element of receiving money from a sex worker. The
Supreme Court did not even consider this less intrusive remedy.
Taken at face value the Bedford case raises the question of whether
legislative fact evidence will ever be necessary in future cases if
invalidation follows from proof of a personal violation. A robust
evidentiary record of third party impact would undoubtedly strengthen a
claim by making it more compelling; however, the question is not one of
strategic value but one of evidentiary necessity. Perhaps the Court is
signalling that the assessment of social facts and the corresponding
development of public policy should remain a matter of legislative
action, and that a court’s primary mandate is to strike down problematic
legislation, whether the problem lies at the core or the periphery. The
refusal to grant a more nuanced remedy may be seen as a response that
needs to be adopted in order to provide the impetus for the legislature to
fulfil its primary mandate of fixing the problems with the law. This
constitutional dialogue theory96 of constitutional adjudication provides
the only sound rationale for a court overreaching in invalidating a law
that is “substantially constitutional”.
The Court is not just refusing to do the dirty work for Parliament of
fixing a constitutionally defective law. The Court may also be signalling
to Parliament that the proper legislative solution for complex social
problems is for lawmakers to enact laws that have the requisite flexibility
to respond to uniquely situated rights claimants. The arbitrary and
grossly disproportionate violation of the security rights of heroin addicts
by the decision of the Minister to refuse to authorize safe injection sites
94
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did not lead to an invalidation of the offending provisions of the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.97 Invalidation was unnecessary
and overreaching as the Court concluded that the presence of a
discretionary exempting provision within the legislation operated as a
constitutional safety valve; that is, building flexibility into the law
allowed the law to operate in a constitutionally proper manner even if the
Minister acting under this law violated the rights of claimants. Similarly,
the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory firearms prohibition upon
conviction for possession of a loaded firearm partly on the basis of the
“ameliorative effects of the exception provided for by section 113 of the
Criminal Code in cases where the prohibition would result in a
deprivation of livelihood or sustenance”.98 A law that is “substantially
constitutional” will be upheld if there are provisions designed to address
its “peripherally problematic” applications.

V. CONCLUSION
It would be comforting to believe that science can provide a clear
answer to all social problems and that public policy should be guided by
the scientific method. There is no question that science can illuminate
and inform, but, in the area of human behaviour and societal
expectations, science usually provides many theories and few
determinate answers. The Supreme Court of Canada is realistic in its
approach to legislative fact evidence and it cannot be faulted for
concluding that “none of the [Charter] principles measure the percentage
of the population that is negatively impacted [by the law]. The analysis is
qualitative, not quantitative.”99
However, even a qualitative analysis requires social science research.
Despite the rhetorical appeal of the statement, “a grossly disproportionate
effect on one person is sufficient to violate the norm”, it does not appear
that the Court is seriously suggesting that invalidation will follow upon
tendering anecdotal and experiential evidence from one rights claimant.
The qualitative analysis the Court speaks of would serve to show that the
experience of the single rights claimant is not unique and is replicated in
other contexts and circumstances with other rights claimants. Showing a
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negative impact on third parties can be accomplished by resort to
reasonable hypotheticals and common sense, but supplementing
argument with a wide array of legislative fact evidence should be the
turning point for a court in considering whether to strike out a law
believed to be beyond redemption. Without this supplementary evidence
a court should restrict its remedial authority to the granting of a personal
remedy, and this will only happen if the courts overcome their aversion
to constitutional exemptions.
The Bedford challenge involved a law found to be beyond repair and
redemption and in this context there was no need to consider the
applicability of a person remedy short of invalidation. However, the
decision to invalidate, instead of reading down or reading in, will serve
to test the theory that invalidation facilitates a constitutional dialogue
between the judiciary and Parliament.
The dialogue theory resonates well with democratic ideals but may
ring hollow in practice. If legislative inertia and indifference led to the
creation of an irrational and contradictory legal regime in the first place,
it may be misplaced confidence to believe that the same institution will
adequately fix the problem upon judicial command. If a court is
presented with a wide array of legislative facts, and it is satisfied that it
can make relevant findings of social fact based on this record, it may not
be prudent to simply bounce the problem back to Parliament. Some
creativity and innovation in finding remedies short of invalidation should
be encouraged because the dialogue theory may be just a pipe dream. In
time we will discover if the Parliamentary response to the Bedford case
will be constitutionally adequate or whether the response will just trigger
the need for another protracted challenge.

